The rapid growth of the private sector in China in recent decades has created a large number of capital-hungry private sector firms. An increasing number of these firms choose to raise equity capital on international exchanges, which typically have stronger disclosure, corporate governance, and investor protection regulations. In light of international investors' and regulators' concerns about the corporate finance practice of China's private sector firms, particularly regarding the integrity of their reported earnings, we investigate whether these firms aggressively manipulate their accounts by examining those listed in Hong Kong, commonly known as P-chips. We find systematic evidence that P-chips engage in more earnings management and other corporate misbehaviors than their counterparts in Hong Kong. We posit and provide evidence consistent with cross-jurisdictional enforcement difficulty as a possible explanation to P-chips' questionable practice, and discuss its implications.
Introduction
Since embarking on a journey of market reforms in 1978, which took a big leap in the 1990s, China's economy has experienced an exponential growth, rising to the second largest economic entity in the world, with a GDP of $10.9 trillion in 2015 (World Bank 2017a). This market-oriented growth was initially fueled by the partial privatization of state-owned enterprises (Jiang and Kim 2015; Sun and Tong 2003; hereafter SOEs) , but in recent years the economic power released by the phenomenal growth of the private sector has dominated the scene (Lu 2015) . The proportion of private enterprises in the economy expanded from less than 20 percent in 1996 to over 70 percent in 2012 (National Bureau of Statistics of China 1998; . The internal growth of these companies soon arrives at a stage that an external source of capital is required for expansion. As these companies seek equity capital both domestically and internationally, the world sees an influx of applications for listings on its stock exchanges by China's private sector companies. These listings spread across global exchanges from the US to London to Singapore, but mostly concentrate on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (hereafter HKSE), making Hong Kong the de facto hub for hosting initial public offerings (hereafter IPOs) of mainland Chinese private sector firms.
Although these popular overseas listing destinations are believed to have high quality securities regulatory environment, there have been mounting concerns that overseas-listed private sector Chinese firms do not behave in a way predicted by the bonding hypothesis (Coffee 2002; Stulz 1999) , which stipulates that cross-listed firms bond to the better investor protection and more stringent listing, disclosure and corporate governance requirements of the foreign market, resulting in them resembling domestic firms of the listing location. Instead, numerous financial scandals associated with overseas Chinese firms broke in recent years, of which some subject investors to significant financial losses.
1 This paper seeks to examine the aggressive corporate reporting behavior of these foreign-listed mainland private sector firms using a large sample of companies listed on the HKSE, commonly known as P-chips, and propose an explanation for their questionable practice that is inconsistent with the bonding hypothesis.
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Since their first listing in the turn of the 21 st century, P-chips have grown substantially, at present representing the largest group of Chinese firms listed on the HKSE in terms of the number of companies, growing from 11 percent of the total in 2005 to nearly 31 percent in 2015.
Assessing their importance based on size, P-chips now represent 20.3 percent of the total market capitalization of all companies listed on the HKSE as at the end of 2015. The increasing market share of P-chips in the Hong Kong market is at the expense of other non-mainland private sector companies, whose market capitalization is now less than 40 percent of the total, despite an increase in their number during the period.
We first compare P-chip companies with their non-mainland private sector counterparts with respect to the level of accruals-based earnings management. We find that P-chips engage in significantly more earnings management than Hong Kong companies, as measured by discretionary accruals estimated using a modified Jones (1991) model (Kothari, Leone, and Wasley 2005) . This result is robust to using matched samples as well as using the probability of meeting or beating consensus forecasts by one cent as an alternative proxy for earnings management (Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser 1999) . Further analyses show that P-chip firms are also more likely to have engaged in other corporate misconduct such as misstating accounting statements and misappropriating corporate resources through tunneling. These results do not conform to the prediction of the bonding hypothesis.
One possible explanation to this deviation is that Hong Kong has lower quality regulatory environment than mainland China in terms of capital market institutions. Evidence from a detailed comparison of the legal system and securities regulations between the two markets, however, does not support this explanation. Our analysis shows that Hong Kong is ahead of mainland China in areas such as investors protection, regulatory quality, listing rules, and corporate governance regulations, except for mainland China having marginally more extensive disclosure rules. More importantly, our survey of the literature and indices compiled by international organizations all indicate that the legal enforcement quality in Hong Kong is superior to that in mainland China. We also document that the average fines in enforcement actions is five times higher in Hong Kong than in China. Taken together, it is unlikely that the deviation from the prediction of the bonding hypothesis is due to Hong Kong having lower quality regulatory environment than mainland China.
We propose cross-jurisdictional enforcement difficulty as a potential explanation to this phenomenon. P-chip companies may be more prone to corporate misconduct because Hong
Kong securities regulators do not have extra-territorial investigation and enforcement jurisdiction in mainland China where P-chip companies are based, and investors may face difficulties to enforce their shareholder rights against P-chip companies and their directors due to complications arising from cross-border access to evidence, legal services, court assistance, or the incremental costs related to those services (HKSE 2013) . Without the assistance and cooperation of relevant Chinese authorities, such as the China Securities Regulatory Commission (hereafter CSRC), provincial and local governments or courts, etc., it is difficult to seize the assets of these firms which are almost entirely located in mainland China, and without an extradition agreement in place between China and Hong Kong, the managers of these firms can "escape" enforcement actions by remaining in mainland China. Muddy Waters, an independent equity research and investment firm that soared to fame after uncovering frauds for a few USand Canada-listed Chinese companies and bringing them down, suggested that the significant number of Chinese companies listed in Hong Kong could make it "the next bastion of fraudulent revelations" (Yousef 2012 ).
Prior research shows that the institutional environment of a company's home location is an important determinant of the likelihood of its cooperation with the firm's listing location in the event of an enforcement action (Duarte, Kong, Siegel, and Young 2014) . Hence, to test whether cross-jurisdictional enforcement difficulty is a plausible explanation to P-chips' misbehavior, we identify the degree of legal and economic development of China's cities/provinces in which P-chip companies are headquartered as a reverse proxy for enforcement difficulty. We find that the extent of earnings management is negatively associated with this enforcement difficulty proxy among P-chip firms, consistent with our prediction. In addition, we document that P-chips' earnings response coefficient is significantly lower than that for Hong Kong firms by 0.21 percentage point in a two-day window surrounding earnings announcements, the magnitude of which is both statistically and economically significant. This evidence supports the view that investors are aware of regulators facing enforcement difficulty against P-chip companies, and they use stock prices as a mechanism to protect themselves against the heightened probability of expropriation by P-chip companies' managers and controlling shareholders. Our paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, we add to the literature that examines the behavior of cross-listed firms relative to local firms in the listing location (e.g., Fung, Su, and Gul 2013; Lang, Raedy, and Wilson 2006) . These prior studies, however, often have a much smaller sample, and their cross-listed firms tend to differ from local firms in terms of listing rules (e.g., American depositary receipts vs. IPOs), disclosure requirement (e.g., 20-F vs. 10-K), and ownership structure (e.g., SOEs vs. private sector firms), which could confound their findings. Our P-chip setting allows us to test the research question using a much larger sample compared to prior studies in this stream, and more importantly, ensures that cross-listed firms and local firms are subject to the same listing and reporting requirements, and are similar in terms of ownership structure. 3 We provide much cleaner evidence that cross-listed firms are more aggressive in earnings management and other corporate malfeasances than local firms. In this regard, our paper echoes Sun, Tong, and Zhang (2013) , who find that cross-listed firms can bring negative impacts to the cross-listing destination in terms of transaction cost for local firms and the overall price informativeness of the market.
Second, our results contribute to its debate about the bonding hypothesis. A few explanations have emerged in the literature to explain findings that are inconsistent with its prediction. Licht (2001 Licht ( , 2003 argues that firms cross-list to access cheaper finance and greater visibility rather than to bond, and the experience in the US shows that they induce regulators to allow foreign issuers to avoid some of the more exacting regulations. Siegel (2005) posits that cross-listed firms bond themselves by building their reputation, but there is a lack of legal bonding with the US, a view shared by Lang et al. (2006) . We underscore and provide evidence on cross-jurisdictional enforcement difficulty as a possible alternative explanation to cross-listed firms' behavior that contradicts the predictions of the bonding hypothesis.
Third, this paper relates to a series of recent studies that examine RM firms listed in the US. Chen, Cheng, Lin, Lin, and Xiao (2016) provide some evidence that the RM process allows Chinese firms that are poorly governed and have low bonding incentives to access the US capital market. We employ a more general setting, as P-chips obtain their Hong Kong listing via both IPOs and RMs, and provide complementary results. 4 Our findings highlight that a listing in a strong legal and enforcement regime does not necessarily lead to high quality reported earnings, 3 Our much larger sample has a further advantage that we can match on multiple dimensions to ensure even closer comparability between cross-listed firms and local firms. 4 Reverse mergers in Hong Kong are subject to bright line tests that may result in many reverse mergers being classified as new listing applications and are subject to similar scrutiny as initial public offerings.
and that it is important to examine the "underlying fundamentals" of a listing that may affect managerial incentives in opportunistic financial reporting.
To our best knowledge, we are the first to directly examine P-chips' earnings management. With private sector firms becoming a dominant economic power in mainland China, and the phenomenal growth of P-chips listed in Hong Kong, the quality of these firms' financial decisions has become an important question for regulators, investors, and other stakeholders. Earnings, being a summary result of a firm's operations during a period, are an important financial indicator upon which the market relies. Earnings manipulation distorts resource allocations and leads to unjustified wealth transfer from investors to managers. Our results thus have important implications for market participants in their investment decisions.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section introduces the institutional details of the Hong Kong stock market. Section 3 presents the research design while Section 4 discusses the sample composition and main empirical results. Section 5 reports additional analyses. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
Institutional background

Regulatory environment in Hong Kong and mainland China
Hong Kong has one of the largest stock markets in the world, despite its small geographical size with merely 7 million residents. The relative low figure in China is primarily a consequence of the Chinese Securities Law capping the fines that can be imposed by the CSRC at CNY600,000 on legal persons and CNY300,000
on natural persons in a majority of legal proceedings.
Mainland Chinese firms on HKSE
The Hong Kong stock market is characterized by a large number of companies originated in mainland China (Chow 2003) . The first China-incorporated listing was approved in 1993
when China started to reform and partially privatize its SOEs (Sun, Tong, and Wu 2013) , but it
was not until the turn of the millennium when we witnessed an influx of listings of mainland Chinese entities from the private sector.
Firms originated from mainland China can list in Hong Kong via two different channels.
First, they can incorporate under Chinese Corporate Law and, upon obtaining the CSRC approval, apply to list directly on the HKSE. These companies are nicknamed H-shares in the market. Alternatively, they can set up off-shore companies, often located in Hong Kong, Bermuda or Cayman Islands, and inject the parent companies' assets into these companies which subsequently list in Hong Kong. These listed entities are referred to as Red-chips if they are controlled by the Chinese state, or P-chips if the parent companies are originated from the Chinese private sector. 7 Since their first listing in 2000, P-chips have become the fastest growing market segment on the HKSE. As shown in Table 2 , which is compiled based on the information provided in the HKSE Monthly Market Highlights and HKSE China Dimension, 8 there are 577 P-chip firms listed on the HKSE (including both the main board and Growth Enterprise Market)
as of December 2015, a total larger than H-shares and Red-chips combined. From 2005 to 2015, the number of P-chips increased by more than 4.5 times from 126 to 577, while H-shares from 120 to 229, and Red-chips from 89 to 145. In addition, as shown in Panel B, the total market capitalization of P-chips has increased substantially in recent years, and is now on par with the market capitalization of either Red-chips or H-shares.
(Insert Table 2 )
Research design
We use discretionary accruals as our primary proxy for earnings management, which is common in the literature in settings such as equity offerings Wong 1998a, 1998b) (2015) and others, we estimate the following model:
The HKSE officially classifies a firm as a Red-chip company if (1) it has a minimum of 30% shareholding controlled by Chinese SOEs or provincial/municipal authorities, or (2) for firms with a Chinese state-related shareholding between 20% and 30% and there is a strong influence by these shareholding on the company's board of directors. P-chips are officially known as Non-H Share Mainland Private Enterprises. 8 https://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/stat/statistics.htm.
where ACCURALS is net income minus operating cash flow scaled by lagged total assets; TA is total assets; REVREC is the change is sales adjusted for receivables scaled by lagged total assets; PPEG is gross value of property, plant and equipment scaled by lagged total assets; ROA is net income scaled by lagged total assets.
Following prior literature, we estimate Equation (1) separately for each pair of year and industry with more than ten observations, and obtain the absolute value of the residuals that forms our main metric of earnings management (ABSJONES). We define industry using the Fama-French 12 industry classification. We then pool all firm-year observations and regress ABSJONES on the dummy variable of interest, PCHIP, which equals one if an observation is a P-chip, and zero otherwise, and a set of control variables (subscripts omitted) as follows: 
A positive (negative) α1 coefficient denotes that P-chips engage in more (less) earnings management through accounting accruals relative to non-P-chip firms.
We control for firm size (SIZE), growth (MTB and SALESGROWTH), and operating performance (ROA and OCF), as prior studies show that these firm characteristics are correlated with earnings management (Subramanyam 1996 , among others). We also control for financial leverage (LEVERAGE), since there is evidence that managers use earnings management to avoid violating debt covenants (e.g., DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994). Prior research shows that firms engage in aggressive earnings management when seeking external financing in equity or debt (Teoh et al. 1998a (Teoh et al. , 1998b Liu, Ning, and Davidson III 2010) , hence we include equity issuance (EQUITYISSUE) and debt issuance (DEBTISSUE). We include the percentage of closely-held shares (OWNERSHIP) because past research shows that managerial and institutional shareholdings are negatively associated with earnings management (Chung, Firth, and Kim. 2002) . Finally, we control for the intensity of analyst monitoring (COVERAGE) and audit quality (BIG4), since monitoring by financial analysts and auditors could limit earnings management behavior (Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and Subramanyam 1998; Yu 2008) . Detailed definition of all variables is outlined in Appendix B.
Evidence on P-chips' aggressive earnings management
Sample and descriptive statistics
We devise the following algorithm to construct our P-chip sample, since the HKSE does not reveal their classification of P-chip companies to the public. First, we classify all firms headquartered in mainland China but not classified as H-shares or Red-chips by the HKSE as Pchips, as these firms have their principal business location in mainland China. Second, for the rest of the firms that are headquartered in Hong Kong or other locations, we impose two criteria to screen P-chips: the ultimate controlling shareholders are mainland China individuals, and the majority of their assets are located and revenues originated in mainland China. 9 We perform this screening by manually searching relevant information in IPO prospectuses (such as details about controlling shareholders), shareholding disclosures obtained from HKExnews, EDGAR's Hong Kong equivalent maintained by the HKSE for the public dissemination of regulatory information about listed companies, and geographical segment information from Capital IQ. Panel A of Table 3 presents some descriptive statistics for our sample. Approximately one third of our sample observations are P-chip companies (1,564 / (1,564+3,237) = 32.6 percent), consistent with their significant presence in Hong Kong. P-chip companies have higher total assets (the median is $270.3 million vs. $176.0 million) and net income (the median is $13.5 million vs. $7.0 million) than non-P-chip companies, which makes them more profitable (the median of return on assets is 6.2% vs. 4.7%). They also have higher market-to-book ratios and sales growth (the medians are 1.5 vs. 0.9, and 23.0% vs. 8.6%, respectively). P-chip firms are less leveraged (the median is 15.2% vs. 22.7%), and over 67.2 percent of the observations are audited by a Big 4 auditor (71.6 percent for non-P-chip observations). The descriptive statistics also indicate that P-chip companies have a higher level of discretionary accruals relative to non-P-chip companies, and the differences (the mean is 0.09 vs. 0.08, and the median is 0.07 vs. 0.05)
are statistically significant at the 1% level.
(Insert Table 3) Panel B shows that the industry distribution between P-chips and non-P-chips is very similar, except for a slightly higher proportion of P-chip firms in capital intensive industries such as business equipment (16.4% vs. non-P-chips' 11.7%), energy (5.4% vs. non-P-chips' 1.4%), and manufacturing (14.2% vs. non-P-chips' 11.2%), and a higher proportion of non-P-chip firms in shops (18.3% vs. non-P-chips' 13.5%). (2) we add financial characteristics of sample firms. Column (3) presents the results with all control variables included. The coefficient on PCHIP is consistently positive and highly significant, indicating that P-chip firms have a substantially higher level of discretionary accruals in absolute value relative to domestic firms, even after controlling for other determinants. The magnitude of the difference is also economically large. Taking the coefficient on PCHIP (= 0.0105) in column (3) as an example,
Comparison of earnings management levels between P-chip and non-P-chip firms
given the average total assets of the sample amounted to $1,004.7 million, this translates to Pchip companies reporting around $10.5 million more in profit (0.0105 × $1,004.7 million)
contributed by discretionary accruals than non-P-chip companies, representing over 22% of the average net income of the P-chip sub-sample (= $46.6 million). Overall, our results provide both statistically and economically significant evidence on P-chips' aggressive earnings management practice relative to non-P-chip firms.
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(Insert Table 4) Concerning the control variables, larger firms are less prone to manipulating accruals, as indicated by the negative sign of the coefficient on SIZE. Consistent with prior literature, high-growth companies, proxied by MTB and SALESGROWTH, are more likely to manage earnings.
The coefficient on OCF is negative, owing to the nature of accruals-based accounting system.
We also find that firms raising capital, through either issuing equity (EQUITYISSUE) or debt (DEBTISSUE), have a higher level of discretionary accruals, consistent with the extant literature.
Finally, we find that lenders play a significant monitoring role but not analysts, as suggested by the negative (positive) coefficient on LEVERAGE (COVERAGE). Overall, most of control variables behave in a way consistent with prior literature and economic intuition.
Robustness analysis based on matched samples
Our main analyses in Table 4 employ samples that consist of all available firm-year observations that qualify for the classification of P-chips and non-P-chips based on a set of criteria. A valid concern is that different characteristics of P-chip vs. non-P-chip sub-samples could drive our results thus far. For example, Panel A of Table 3 reveals that a median P-chip firm tends to be larger, more profitable, and growing faster than a median non-P-chip firm. To address this issue, we first match P-chip with non-P-chip observations by industry and fiscal year.
Next, we introduce size (SIZE) followed by growth (SALEGROWTH) to the matching criteria because prior literature underscores their importance in shaping firm-level accruals (Collins, Pungaliya, and Vijh 2017) . 12 We then re-estimate Equation (2) using these matched samples and report the results in Table 5 , in columns (1), (2), and (3) respectively. The resulting sample size decrease gradually, but the coefficients on PCHIP are consistently positive and significant, and most importantly the results remain similar to those reported in Table 4 based on the full sample.
(Insert Table 5 )
Alternative measures of earnings manipulation
Our main inferences rely on the validity of a modified Jones (1991) discretionary accruals model (i.e., ABSJONES). Despite the popularity of Jones-type models, they have some drawbacks, such as their sensitivity to business models (Owens, Wu, and Zimmerman 2017) , and the industry-year cross-sectional estimation procedure significantly limiting the sample size (Ecker, Francis, Olsson, and Schipper 2013) . In this section, we first use an alternative earnings management proxy that is not based on accruals and thus circumvents the accruals estimation problem, and then propose other metrics that measure firms' misbehavior to strengthen our argument.
Our non-accruals-based proxy for earnings management is the probability of firms meeting or just beating analysts' consensus forecasts (e.g., Degeorge et al. 1999) . A significant volume of past research shows that firms have incentives to manipulate earnings to meet or beat the analysts' earnings forecasts by a small amount to avoid the negative stock market or executive compensation consequences of missing the market expectations (see, e.g., Jensen 2005 for a discussion). We construct an indicator variable that takes the value of one if a firm-year meets or beats the last consensus analysts' forecast before an earnings announcement by one cent, and zero otherwise. Our results, presented in column (1) of Table 6 , indicate that P-chips are 40% more likely to meet or just beat analysts' forecasts by one cent than non-P-chip firms.
(Insert Table 6 ) Next, we focus on more serious corporate misdeeds other than earnings management:
misstating financial statements and tunneling corporate resources. We first estimate the probability of material accounting misstatements using the prediction model developed by Dechow, Ge, Larson, and Sloan (2011). 13 This model synthesizes financial statement variables that are useful for detecting material accounting misstatements and generates an F score, a higher value of which indicates higher misstatement likelihood. This measure has an advantage that it incorporates other measures beyond accruals to estimate the likelihood of earnings misstatements.
We define HIGHFSCORE as a dummy variable that equals one for firm-years with abovenormal risk, and zero otherwise. Column (2) of Table 6 shows that P-chip firms have a substantially higher probability of materially misstating their financial statements, consistent with our prediction. Our second additional metric measures whether P-chips misappropriate company resources at the expense of minority shareholders through tunneling resources out of the companies to their controlling shareholders. Cheung, Rau, and Stouraitis (2006) (3) is positive and significant, indicating that P-chips engage in tunneling of corporate resources to expropriate minority shareholders.
Step 1: Predicted Value = -7.893 + 0.790 × RSST + 2.518 × CHREC + 1.191 × CHINV + 1.979 × SOFTASSETS + 0.171 × CHCS -0.932 × CHROA + 1.029 × ISSUE.
Step 2: Conditional Probability = e (Predicted Value) / (1 + e (Predicted Value) ). RSST represents balance sheet accruals calculated as per Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, and Tuna (2005) ; CHREC represents changes in account receivables; CHINV represents changes in inventory; SOFTASSETS represents the percentage of soft assets, measured as total assets minus fixed assets and cash; CHCS represents changes in cash sales; CHROA represents changes in return-on-assets; ISSUE is an indicator variable that equals one for securities issuance, and zero otherwise. The F score is then calculated as the conditional probability scaled by the unconditional probability of material misstatements. We use the unconditional probability estimated by Dechow et al. (2011) , which is 0.37%, and classify F score greater than one as above normal risk of misstatement.
Taken together, we provide robust evidence that P-chip companies consistently engage in more corporate malfeasances than their counterparts listed in Hong Kong. This finding is opposite to the prediction of the bonding hypothesis. As we discussed in Section 2.1 about the institutional background, Hong Kong overall has a better regulatory environment than mainland China. Hence, the deviation from the prediction of the bonding hypothesis cannot be explained by the listing location having a less superior regulatory environment than the home location. In the next section, we conjecture, and present evidence on, cross-jurisdictional enforcement difficulty as an explanation to this deviation.
Cross-jurisdictional enforcement difficulty
The notion of enforcement difficulty
The presence of enforcement difficulty has long been echoed in Hong Kong regulators' Wang and Yiu 2004). All these factors translate to lack of evidence with which to support prosecutions or enforcement actions in Hong Kong against P-chips from mainland China. In this regard, we argue that, even though Hong Kong has high regulatory standards for listed firms, in the presence of cross-jurisdictional enforcement difficulty, managers of P-chip firms perceive lower risks in mis-behaving, and thus have stronger incentives to engage in opportunistic behaviors to extract private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders.
Cross-sectional variation in enforcement difficulty
If Hong Kong securities regulators need to investigate P-chips' alleged irregularities or enforce the outcome of the investigations, such as seizing their assets or bringing their key managers to face justice, they will likely require the assistance of local authorities such as provincial governments and courts at the companies' home location. Duarte et al. (2013) institutions. There are significant regional variations amongst Chinese cities and provinces in terms of institutional environment (Chen, Wang, Li, Sun, and Tong 2015) . We posit that if a Pchip firm is headquartered in a city/province that is more economically and legally developed, the local authorities and regulators will be more willing to assist their Hong Kong counterparts in investigating securities and financial wrongdoings and the resulting enforcement actions. We match each P-chip company to the marketization index by year and the city/province in which the company is headquartered. 16 If aggressive earnings management is indeed associated with the level of cross-jurisdictional enforcement difficulty, we expect a higher level of enforcement difficulty in less developed business environment. Since some companies are headquartered in Hong Kong, which is not included in the index, we assign the highest value of the index among all cities/provinces in that year to Hong Kong. We lose 11 observations due to unavailability of their headquarters location data.
We present our analysis in Table 7 . First, we regress earnings management on the marketization index (MARKETIZATION) in column (1). The coefficient on MARKETIZATION is negative and significant at the 1% level, indicating that P-chip firms from cities/provinces with a stronger legal and economic environment engage less in earnings management, consistent with the prediction of the enforcement difficulty explanation. 17 We next separate P-chip firms headquartered in mainland China into three groups: the headquarters cities/provinces are of low (Insert Table 7 )
Market response to P-chip's earnings announcement
If both regulators and P-chip companies are aware of the problem of cross-jurisdictional enforcement difficulty, it is natural to expect that investors also know of the potential negative consequences such as earnings management, and hence they may associate lower credibility to 
CAR is the cumulative abnormal returns in a specified short-window around the earnings announcement date, where abnormal return is defined as the firm's return less the return of the Hang Seng Index. 18 SUE is unexpected earnings deciles measured as the change in return on assets. We include firm size, market-to-book ratio, and an indicator of negative earnings as controls alongside year and industry fixed effects. Table 8 presents the results with CAR measured in two different windows. In both windows, the coefficients on SUE, which measure the market reaction to non-P-chip firms' earnings surprises, are positive and significant as expected. More importantly, the interaction term SUE×PCHIP reports a negative and significant coefficient, indicating that the market discounts P-chips' earnings surprises. The magnitude of the discount is economically significant -more than 30 percent relative to non-P-chip companies' earnings surprises depending on the return window. This result provides corroborative evidence that P-chip companies engage in earnings management activities against the benefits of minority shareholders, but the market anticipates their misbehavior.
(Insert Table 8 )
Alternative cross-listing settings
To further substantiate cross-jurisdictional enforcement difficulty as an explanation behind P-chips' aggressive earnings management relative to local Hong Kong listed firms, we seek its external validity using alternative cross-listing settings.
AH versus non-AH firms
Our first alternative setting explores firms incorporated in mainland China and listed on the HKSE, commonly known as H-shares. Like P-chips, H-share firms primarily operate in we expect that AH firms engage in less earnings management than non-AH firms.
We obtain a list of H-shares from the HKSE Fact Book and a list of AH firms from Capital IQ. Column (1) of Table 9 reports the regression results based on a sample of H-shares from 2005 to 2011, using a specification similar to Equation (2) by replacing PCHIP with AH, the variable of interest, which takes the value of one for AH firms, and zero for non-AH firms. In column (1), we include the same set of control variables as in Table 4 . The coefficient on AH is negative and significant, consistent with our expectation based on cross-jurisdictional enforcement difficulty. process (Chen et al. 2016; Siegel and Wang 2013; among others) . We broaden the sample to include all private sector firms from mainland China that cross-list in the US, via RM or IPO, and repeat our analysis with the US sample using Equation (2). We use the Halter USX China Index to identify Chinese private sector firms listed in the US, and report the results in Column (2) of Table 9 . The coefficient on USPCHIP, a dummy variable indicating these Chinese private sector firms, is positive and significant, which corroborates our main earnings management results and further substantiates enforcement difficulty behind cross-listed firms' aggressive reporting behavior.
(Insert Table 9 )
Conclusion
In this paper, we provide some descriptive evidence that P-chip firms, the largest and most representative group of Chinese private sector firms listed overseas, manipulate their accounts and engage in corporate malfeasance. We further explore the role of cross-jurisdictional enforcement difficulty as a potential explanation to P-chips' aggressive earnings management, and find multiple corroborative evidence supporting this conjecture.
Even though Hong Kong has high quality regulatory standards than mainland China, investigating P-chips' wrongdoing is difficult and challenging because P-chips largely operate in a regime that does not have a strong legal cooperation with Hong Kong (Wheatley 2006 ).
Consequently, the difficulty faced by Hong Kong regulators to enforce securities law and regulations on P-chip firms results in a situation in which, instead of "bonding" P-chips with Hong Kong's high quality regulations, the Hong Kong listing further intensifies the conflicts between P-chips' controlling shareholders and minority investors, leading P-chips to behave in a way that deviates from the prediction of the bonding hypothesis.
Our conclusion is subject to several caveats. While we believe that understanding how Pchip firms behave in the international capital market arena is important, and that results concerning P-chip firms are interesting in their own right, we acknowledge that the P-chip setting is special, if not unique, and therefore generalization of our results to other cross-listed firms should be exercised with caution. Moreover, while we argue that cross-jurisdictional enforcement difficulty is a contributing factor to what we find, we cannot draw a definite causal link from enforcement difficulty to P-chips' aggressive earnings management, because we cannot observe the same P-chip firms without enforcement difficulty. Despite these caveats, we believe our findings are relevant to academics and regulators as well as investors who seek to invest and diversify their portfolios through the inclusion of China's private sector firms. 
APPENDIX B Variable definition
Variable
Definition ABSJONES Absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated based on performanceadjusted Jones model (Kothari et al. 2005 ) PCHIP An indicator variable that equals one if a firm is a P-chip company, and zero otherwise SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets MTB Ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity at fiscal year end SALESGROWTH Percentage change in sales over two consecutive years ROA Net income scaled by one-year lagged total assets OCF Operating cash flow scaled by total assets LEVERAGE Total debt deflated by market value of equity at fiscal year end EQUITYISSUE An indicator variable that equals one if a firm's common equity increases by more than 10% from last year, and zero otherwise DEBTISSUE An indicator variable that equals one if a firm's total debt increases by more than 10% from last year, and zero otherwise OWNERSHIP Fraction of outstanding shares held by insiders, block holders (over 5%), other corporations not in a fiduciary capacity, and pension plans COVERAGE Natural logarithm of one plus the number of analyst following a firm at fiscal year end BIG4 An indicator variable that equals one if a firm is audited by a Big 4 auditor in the fiscal year, and zero otherwise HIGHFSCORE An indicator variable that equals one if the probability of material misstatement estimated using the F-score model (Dechow et al. 2011 ) is above normal risk, and zero otherwise MBE An indicator variable that equals one if a firm meets or beats consensus earnings forecasts by one cent
TUNNELING
Other receivables deflated by total assets CAR Cumulative abnormal returns over a specified window around the earnings announcement date, whereby abnormal return is defined as a firm's return less the return of the Hang Seng Index SUE Deciles of unexpected earnings measured as the change in earnings scaled by total assets LOSS An indicator variable that equals one if a firm has negative net income, and zero otherwise USPCHIP An indicator that equals one if a US-listed firm is from the Chinese private sector, and zero otherwise AH An indicator that equals one if an H-share firm is dual-listed in mainland China, and zero otherwise Djankov et al. (2008) and calculated by summing six indicator variables counting the existence of six legal rules (vote by mail, shares not deposited, cumulative voting, oppressed minority, pre-emptive rights, and capital to call a meeting) favorable to shareholders within a jurisdiction. Creditor rights index is compiled by La Porta et al. (1998) for Hong Kong and Allen et al. (2005) for China, calculated by summing four indicator variables counting the existence of four legal rules (no automatic stay on assets, secured creditors first paid, restriction for going into reorganization, management does not stay in reorganization) favorable to creditors within a jurisdiction. Anti-self-dealing index is compiled by Djankov et al. (2008) and calculated as the average of ex ante private control of selfdealing (approval by disinterested shareholders, disclosure by buyer, disclosures by seller, and independent review) and ex post private control of self-dealing (disclosure in periodic filings, standing to sue; rescission, ease of holding the seller civilly liable, ease of holding the approving body civilly liable, access to evidence). Regulatory quality index is from World Bank (2017a) Worldwide Governance Indicators. CLSA corporate governance index is from CLSA (2010) CG Watch 2010 Report produced in collaboration with the Asian Corporate Governance Association. Disclosure index is from World Bank (2017b) World Development Indicators. Rule of law index is from World Bank (2017a) Worldwide Governance Indicators. Accounting enforcement index is from Brown et al. (2014) . Average fine imposed is calculated based on the fines disclosed in 2011 regulatory action press releases by the CSRC (China) or the SFC (Hong Kong).
Mainland China
Hong (Kothari et al. 2005) . PCHIP represents P-chip companies in our sample; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; MTB is market-to-book ratio; SALESGROWTH is sales growth rate over two consecutive years; ROA is return on assets; OCF is operating cash flow scaled by total assets; LEVERAGE is total debt divided by market value of equity; EQUITYISSUE and DEBTISSUE are proxies for equity and debt issuance respectively; OWNERSHIP represents closely-held shares; COVERAGE is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts following a firm; BIG4 is a Big four auditor indicator. More detailed variable definitions are outlined in Appendix B. We report regression coefficients followed by heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (White 1980) in parentheses, clustered by firm (Rogers 1993 (1), each P-chip firm is matched to a non-P-chip firm in the same industry and year. In column (2), SIZE is added to the matching criteria. In column (3), an additional criterion of SALESGROWTH is added. The dependent variable is ABSJONES that represents the absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated using the performance-adjusted Jones model (Kothari et al. 2005) . PCHIP represents P-chip companies in our sample; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; MTB is market-to-book ratio; SALESGROWTH is sales growth rate over two consecutive years; ROA is return on assets; OCF is operating cash flow scaled by total assets; LEVERAGE is total debt divided by market value of equity; EQUITYISSUE and DEBTISSUE are proxies for equity and debt issuance respectively; OWNERSHIP represents closely-held shares; COVERAGE is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts following a firm; BIG4 is a Big four auditor indicator. More detailed variable definitions are outlined in Appendix B. We report regression coefficients followed by heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (White 1980) in parentheses, clustered by firm (Rogers 1993 HIGHFSCORE is an indicator variable that equals one if the probability of material misstatement estimated using the Fscore model (Dechow et al. 2011 ) is above normal risk, and zero otherwise. TUNNELING is proxied by other receivables scaled by total assets. PCHIP represents P-chip companies in our sample; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; MTB is market-to-book ratio; SALESGROWTH is sales growth rate over two consecutive years; ROA is return on assets; OCF is operating cash flow scaled by total assets; LEVERAGE is total debt divided by market value of equity; EQUITYISSUE and DEBTISSUE are proxies for equity and debt issuance respectively; OWNERSHIP represents closely-held shares; COVERAGE is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts following a firm; BIG4 is a Big four auditor indicator. More detailed variable definitions are outlined in Appendix B. We report regression coefficients followed by heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (White 1980) in parentheses, clustered by firm (Rogers 1993 results of comparing the level of earnings management among P-chip companies for a sample period from 2005 to 2011, conditional on their legal and economic development. The benchmark group is non-P-chip firms. The dependent variable is ABSJONES that represents the absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated using the performance-adjusted Jones model (Kothari et al. 2005) . MARKETIZATION is the level of legal and economic development of the Chinese province in which a P-chip firm is headquartered; HIGH_MARKETIZATION is an indicator that equals one for cities/provinces that have the lowest 25th percentile of the NERI index value among P-chip observations, and zero otherwise; MEDIUM_MARKETIZATION is an indicator that equals one for cities/provinces that have an NERI index value between the 25th and 75th percentile among P-chip observations, and zero otherwise; LOW_MARKETIZATION is an indicator that equals one for cities/provinces that have the highest 25th percentile of the NERI index value among P-chip observations, and zero otherwise; PCHIP represents P-chip companies in our sample. Control variables are the same as those included in Table 4 . More detailed variable definitions are outlined in Appendix B. We report regression coefficients followed by heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (White 1980) in parentheses, clustered by firm (Rogers 1993 
TABLE 8 Market analysis
This table compares the market reaction to earnings announcements between P-chip and non-P-chip firms for a sample period from 2005 to 2011. CAR(0, +1) is the cumulative abnormal returns over the (0,+1) window around the earnings announcement date; CAR (-1, +5 ) is the cumulative abnormal returns over the (-1,+5) window around the earnings announcement date; PCHIP represents P-chip companies in our sample; SUE represents the deciles of earnings surprise measured as the change in earnings scaled by total assets; LOSS is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm reports a loss, and zero otherwise; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; MTB is market-to-book ratio. More detailed variable definitions are outlined in Appendix B. We report regression coefficients followed by heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (White 1980) in parentheses, clustered by firm (Roger 1993). *, **, *** indicate that a coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, in two-tailed tests.
CAR (0, +1)
CAR (-1 (1), and between US-listed Chinese private sector firms and domestic US firms in column (2). In both cases the sample period is from 2005 to 2011. The dependent variable is ABSJONES that represents the absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated using the performanceadjusted Jones model (Kothari et al. 2005) . AH is an indicator for H-share firms also listed in China; USPCHIP is an indicator for private sector Chinese firms listed in the US. Control variables are the same as those included in Table 4 . More detailed variable definitions are outlined in Appendix B. We report regression coefficients followed by heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (White 1980) in parentheses, clustered by firm (Rogers 1993 
